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ARTICLES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE TORT SYSTEM
Griffin B. Bell*
Perry E. Pearce**
This article is based on the Emmanuel Emroch Lecture Series
address delivered by the Honorable Griffin B. Bell on April 8,
1987 at the T. C. Williams School of Law. Each year the Emman-
uel Emroch Lecture Series features practitioners and academi-
cians who are authorities on a particular area of the law. The
University of Richmond Law Review applauds Mr. Emroch's com-
mitment to excellence in legal education and his continued sup-
port of the T. C. Williams School of Law.
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1763, when the doctrine of punitive damages was first ar-
ticulated,1 the concept has become almost commonplace in jury
awards.2 Not only have punitive damage awards grown common-
place, they have also grown excessive. All too frequently we read
* Partner, King & Spalding, Atlanta, Ga.; Georgia Southwestern College; LL.B., cum
laude, 1948, Mercer University. Judge Bell was appointed by President Carter as the U.S.
Attorney General from 1977 to 1979. He served as a judge on the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit from 1961 to 1976. Judge Bell also served as president of the American College
of Trial Lawyers in 1985-86.
** Associate, King & Spalding, Atlanta, Ga.; B.A., 1973, University of Alabama at Hunts-
ville; J.D., 1980, University of Alabama.
1. Wilkes v. Wood, 2 Wils. K.B. 204, 95 Eng. Rep. 767 (C.P. 1763). Wilkes brought a
successful action for trespass after his house was searched and property seized because he
had published a pamphlet that allegedly libeled the King. Punitive damages were also
awarded in 1763 in the case of Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P.
1763).
2. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS
47-52 (1987) [hereinafter UPDATE]. For example, a study conducted by the Institute for Civil
Justice showed that one out of every seven jury verdicts in the San Francisco area from 1980
to 1984 included a punitive damage award. Id. at 48-49 (citing M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M.
SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 9 (1987)).
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about large punitive damage awards bearing no reasonable rela-
tionship to the actual damages. For example, in Georgia this year,
a .jury awarded a construction company $5 million in punitive
damages for $53,000 of property damage to a bulldozer where the
bulldozer merely hit a petroleum line that was not buried deep
enough!3 Such awards have given rise to the criticism that punitive
damages are one of the major problems in tort law.
Reforming the doctrine of punitive damages is necessary if our
tort system is to remain viable. One possible reform is a cap on
punitive damages. The cap could be based on a reasonable rela-
tionship to the compensatory damage award, such as a 2-to-1 ratio,
or on the amount of the fine for the most comparable crime in the
penal code. Another approach is to allow the jury to award actual
damages and to find whether the plaintiff has proved malice. The
court would then set the amount of punitive damages. A third pos-
sibility for reform is to require the defendant to pay all or a per-
centage of the punitive damage award to the federal or state gov-
ernments, depending on whether the award comes from a federal
or state court.
Until such reform is enacted into law, judges should not hesitate
to use their remittitur power if they find that the punitive damages
awarded by the jury are excessive. Recently, in Kemp v. Ervin,4
the court ordered a remittitur and reduced a $2.3 million jury
award of punitive damages to $400,000, finding the original award
"shockingly excessive." 5 The court explained that it did not want
to financially destroy the two defendants and determined that a
reasonable amount of punitive damages was twice the amount of
damages awarded by the jury for mental anguish. If judges used
their remittitur power more often to insure that a punitive damage
award bears a reasonable relationship to the award of actual dam-
ages, there would be less criticism of punitive damages.
3. This case involved one of the authors' clients; out of respect for the client's privacy, the
authors have requested that a citation to this case not be provided. Eds.
4. 651 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ga. 1986). The case, which drew much media attention, in-
volved a section 1983 claim brought by English professor Dr. Jan Kemp against two admin-
istrators of the University of Georgia. Kemp claimed that she had been fired for speaking
out about the poor academic records of several graduating student athletes.
5. Id. at 498.
6. Id. at 509.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages evolved from the statutory remedy of award-
ing multiple damages. The first recorded legal system to allow the
award of civil punitive damages was the Code of Hammurabi in
2000 B.C.7 Similar forms of damages also appeared in the Hindu
Code of Manu in 200 B.C. and in the Hittite law in 1400 B.C.8 The
Old Testament also contains several examples of multiple damage
remedies such as for theft, adultery, and usury." Commentators
disagree on whether Roman civil law ever recognized the concept
of punitive damages. 10
In England, the notion of exemplary or punitive damages first
appeared in the 1700's to justify jury verdicts in excess of actual
physical damage.11 The concept of punitive damages was first ar-
ticulated by an English court in Wilkes v. Wood.1 2 The court re-
ferred to these additional damages as "exemplary damages," which
were awarded to compensate the injured plaintiff for non-physical
injuries, and to punish the wrongdoer. The doctrine of punitive
damages was criticized as it developed in England. By 1964, the
English courts were regularly awarding compensatory damages for
non-physical injuries, thus severely limiting the need for punitive
awards because the compensatory function was no longer
necessary.1 3
One of the earliest American cases to discuss the doctrine of pu-
nitive damages was Coryell v. Colbaugh,1 4 an action brought in
New Jersey in 1791 for breach of promise to marry. The court
charged the jury in this case "not to estimate the damage by any
particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for
7. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (1980); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A
Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984).
8. See K. REDDEN, supra note 7, at § 2.2(A)(1).
9. See id.
10. See Sales & Cole, supra note 7, at 1119; Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Criti-
cal Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 369 (1965); see also Sales, The Emer-
gence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel,
14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 353-54 (1983).
11. See supra note 1.
12. 2 Wils. K.B. 204, 95 Eng. Rep. 767 (C.P. 1763).
13. See Rookes v. Barnard, 1 All E.R. 367 (1964) (limiting punitive damages to cases
involving unconstitutional actions by government employees and cases wherein defendant's
profits exceeded the plaintiff's damages).
14. 1 N.J.L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1791).
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example's sake, to prevent such offenses in [the] future."'15 The
court instructed further that the damages should be "such a sum
as would mark [the jury's] disapprobation, and be an example to
others."' 16 Although other courts began allowing punitive damages
awards to deter wrongful conduct, still others criticized the award
of damages in excess of the actual damage to the injured party be-
cause there was no legal basis for such awards in civil cases.' 7
Early American decisions justified the award of punitive dam-
ages on the dual theories of compensation and punishment. In the
early 1800's, the courts broadened the concept of actual damages
to include intangible harm. As a result, the original function of ex-
emplary damages to compensate for such items as pain and suffer-
ing came to be served by actual damages, and the award of exem-
plary damages for such injuries was superfluous. After the 1830's,
the increasing number of actual damage awards for mental anguish
led courts to focus on the deterrence and penal functions of exem-
plary damages.' 8
III. CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Punishment versus Deterrence
The concept of punitive damages has been criticized since its in-
ception. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that authorize
the recovery of punitive damages espouse the theory that punitive
damages serve two functions: (1) to punish past wrongful conduct;
and (2) to deter future wrongful conduct.'9 Both theories of pun-
15. Id. at 91.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872); McKeon v. Citizens Ry., 42 Mo. 79
(1867).
18. See K. REDDEN, supra note 7, at § 2.3(B).
19. See, e.g., Macon-Bibb County Water and Sewerage Auth. v. Tuttle/White Construc-
tors, 530 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Roberson v. Ammons, 477 So. 2d 957 (Ala. 1985);
Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675 (1986); Castaic Clay Mfg.
Co. v. Dedes, 167 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 213 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1985); Coale v. Dow Chem. Co., 701
P.2d 885 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987); Chrysler
Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1986); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, P84
N.E.2d 353 (1978); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 1986); Smith
v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 731 P.2d 871 (1987); Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 1367 (1987); Wu-
erderman v. J.O. Lively Constr. Co., 602 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Gonzales v. San-
soy, 103 N.M. 127, 703 P.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1984); Micari v. Mann, 126 Misc. 2d 422, 481
N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 283 S.E.2d 507 (1981); Floyd v.
Dodson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Lane County v. Wood, 298 Or. 191, 691 P. 2d
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ishment and deterrence are criticized for being inconsistent with
each other and for being inconsistently applied by the courts in
particular cases.
Historically, the objective of civil law has been not to confer a
profit or a windfall upon an injured party, but rather to make the
injured party whole. Payment of punitive damage awards to the
state or federal government rather than to the plaintiff seems a
more sensible way of accomplishing the deterrence or punishment
function, while at the same time remaining true to the basic objec-
tive of the law of damages.
B. Double Jeopardy
Some commentators charge that the award of punitive damages
violates the rule against double jeopardy by imposing a double
punishment for the same crime.2 0 This criticism arises from the sit-
uation where the defendant can be assessed punitive damages in a
civil action for the same acts for which he can be fined in a crimi-
nal action. The punishment inflicted in both cases may exceed
what is sufficient to deter or punish the defendant.
This problem is exacerbated by the inability of the civil and
criminal justice systems to recognize their mutual interest in pun-
ishing or deterring the wrongdoer. For instance, in sentencing, the
judge in the criminal court may not consider the punitive damages
awarded by a civil jury. Similarly, a civil jury may not be told that
the defendant has been or could be subjected to criminal prosecu-
tion for the same acts. Thus, both courts might punish the defend-
ant for his malice or wrongdoing. In light of this problem, perhaps
the civil plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue of malice should be
heightened to correspond with that required in the criminal courts.
Such a provision might also be effectively coupled with a require-
ment that punitive damages be related to penal fines.
473 (1984); Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986);
Metcalf v. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking,
696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985); Wallen v. Allen, 231 Va. 289, 343 S.E.2d 73 (1986); Leach v.
Biscayne Oil and Gas Co., 169 W. Va. 624, 289 S.E.2d 197 (1982).
20. See Walther & Plein, supra note 10, at 384.
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C. Relation to Compensatory Damages
The most often repeated criticism of punitive damages is that
the jury has unfettered discretion to award any amount of punitive
damages even if the amount bears no relationship to the "actual"
damages. For example, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,2' an
Alabama jury awarded $3.5 million dollars in punitive damages
against an insurance company for its bad faith refusal to pay a
$1,650.22 hospital bill. Although some jurisdictions require a rea-
sonable relationship between the actual and punitive damages,22
the Alabama courts do not require such a correlation.
One of the questions presented to the United States Supreme
Court on appeal was whether the award of punitive damages vio-
lated the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.23 Unfor-
tunately, the Court did not reach this question. Instead, the Court
vacated and remanded the case on the grounds that an associate
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court should have disqualified
himself from participation in the decision because he had filed a
similar insurer bad faith claim.24
The Supreme Court recently noted probable jurisdiction in an-
other case raising the issue of whether a punitive damage award
violates the excessive fines clause. In Bankers Life and Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw,25 the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a jury
award of punitive damages against an insurance company that had
refused to honor a claim. The jury awarded $1.6 million in punitive
damages in addition to $20,000 actual damages.26 In its appeal to
the Supreme Court, the insurance company contended that the pu-
nitive damages award violates the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth amendment.
The majority of jurisdictions allowing punitive damages require
actual or compensatory damages as a prerequisite to an award of
punitive damages. However, the amount of actual or compensatory
damages required is not specifically defined, and nominal actual
damages will often suffice. Factors to be considered in fixing puni-
21. 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986).
22. See, e.g., Adams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1977).
23. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) (vacating 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala.
1984)).
24. Id. at 1591.
25. 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 1367 (1987).
26. 483 So. 2d at 256.
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tive damages include: (1) the nature of the defendant's acts; (2) the
amount of the compensatory damages awarded; and (3) the wealth
of the defendant." In addition, some jurisdictions require the
amount of exemplary damages to be reasonably related to the
amount of actual damages.2 " This "reasonable relationship" rule
allows an appellate court either to overturn a punitive damage
award, or to order remittitur if the court concludes that a reasona-
ble relationship between the compensatory damages and the puni-
tive damages does not exist. Other courts do not require a reasona-
ble relationship between actual and punitive damages but rely
instead on the judge's remittitur power to control grossly excessive
awards.2" Finally, some courts allow evidence of a defendant's fi-
nancial net worth so that the jury may set the punitive damages
award at a level sufficient to punish or deter.30
Allowing the jury to decide only whether there is sufficient mal-
ice to support an award of punitive damages is another way to cur-
tail excessive punitive damages awards. The problems that occur
when juries decide the amount of punitive damages to be awarded
are revealed by the following jury charge, which was approved on
appeal by the Fifth Circuit in Martin v. Texaco, Inc.3 1 The trial
court instructed the jury on the standard for measuring punitive
damages under Texas law as follows:
The appropriate ratio will vary from case to case, depending on
such factors as the character of the wrongful conduct, the extent to
which the defendant is involved in the conduct, and the extent to
27. See, e.g., Professional Seminar Consultants v. Sino Am. Technology Exch. Council,
727 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law); TDS, Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co.,
760 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Florida law); Bemer Aviation v. Hughes Helicopter,
Inc., 621 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1985), afJ'd, 802 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1986); Jardel Co. v.
Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).
28. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 802 (1986); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458
(E.D. Tex. 1985); Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 602 (D. Colo.
1983); Sprague v. Walter, 357 Pa. Super. -, 516 A.2d 706 (1986), appeal granted, 524 A.2d
495 (Pa. 1987).
29. See, e.g., Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1984) (ap-
plying Missouri law); Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Ohio law);
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying Virginia law); Guccione v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So. 2d
1097 (Ala. 1986); Appropriate Technology Corp. v. Palma, 146 Vt. 643, 508 A.2d 724 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Arab Termite and Pest Control of Florida, Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039,
1043 (Fla. 1982); Zambrano v. Devanesan, 484 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 494 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1986).
31. 726 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1984).
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which that conduct offends the public sense of justice and propriety.
A very recent court decision listed five relevant factors for review-
ing a jury's award of punitive damages, as follows:
(1) the nature of the wrong;
(2) the character of the conduct involved;
(3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer;
(4) the situation and sensibility of the parties;
(5) the extent to which defendant's conduct offends the public
sense of justice and propriety.2
The subjectivity of these factors, which are frequently found in
jury instructions, illustrates the advantage of having the trial court
fix the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. This would
avoid the aberrant jury awards that are increasingly found in the
crazy quilt of the tort system.
D. Mass Tort Cases
Repeated punitive damage awards against the same defendant in
multiple product liability suits are another major problem on the
litigation front.3 Judge Friendly recognized this problem in Rogin-
sky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. ,M explaining that repetitive puni-
tive damage awards in mass products liability cases would subject
a defendant to vastly excessive damage awards when viewed in
their entirety.
Large companies are forced into bankruptcy to avoid successive
awards of large punitive damages and the prospect of more such
awards. Thousands of punitive damage suits have been filed
against manufacturers because of a single defective product. A
company's total exposure for a product can far exceed any fine for
a criminal violation.3 5
32. Id. at 213.
33. See generally Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REv. 139, 141 (1986).
34. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. The A. H. Robins Pharmaceutical Company in Richmond, Virginia is an excellent
example of a business "forced" into bankruptcy as a result of repetitive punitive damage
awards for the same defective product. Beginning in the late 1970's, virtually thousands of
plaintiffs brought actions against A. H. Robins for injuries sustained from the Dalkon
Shield, a contraceptive device manufactured by A H. Robins. Partly as a consequence of
routine and substantial punitive damage awards, the company entered Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation. There are currently more than 300,000 claimants waiting to share in the company's
assets.
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The legal community must find a way to reduce subsequent pu-
nitive damage awards by amounts previously paid. This could be
accomplished by a jury instruction or by remittitur. The rules of
the federal multi-district litigation panel should be amended to
permit trials in one or as few federal or state courts as possible in
the mass tort cases. A fund could be created in which all claimants
would share after compensatory damages have been awarded or
settlements made. The current system favors plaintiffs getting
judgments before the defendant company enters bankruptcy and
encourages a race to the courthouse. Plaintiffs with pending cases
or injuries that become apparent much later are deprived of any
punitive damages.
In sum, the power vested in juries to assume the public role of
imposing the equivalent of the criminal fine may be misplaced. Al-
lowing juries virtually unfettered discretion to make punitive
awards on an ad hoc basis smacks of vigilante justice. The jury is
transformed into a roving commission to punish and deter wrong-
doing by transferring wealth. Putting the net worth of the defend-
ant in evidence to relate the punitive award to the total worth of
defendant exacerbates the problem and is an open invitation for
outrageous awards against companies with substantial assets.
IV. RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Legal Standards
Punitive damages have been awarded in a myriad of factual situ-
ations involving disparate legal theories. Reliance by the courts on
various legal bases for punitive awards has resulted in subtle
changes in jury instructions and articulations of the burdens of
proof. Thus, the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff brings his action
often dramatically affects whether and to what extent punitive
damages may be awarded.
Most jurisdictions focus on outrageous or aggravated conduct by
the defendant rather than on the nature or extent of the harm to
the plaintiff. Courts usually require "circumstances of aggravation
or outrage such as spite or malice or a fraudulent or evil motive on
the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disre-
gard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called will-
1987]
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ful or wanton." 6 Mere negligence is not enough,37 though some
courts expand gross negligence to include "conscious indifference
to consequences" as a justification for punitive damages."s At least
one jurisdiction has ruled that punitive damages may be recovered
for gross negligence where that gross negligence is shown by viola-
tion of a statute.39 Another court has ruled that gross negligence
will not support an award of punitive damages.4"
Courts have espoused various standards in analyzing the type of
wrongful conduct which will justify punitive awards. For example,
a Florida appellate court in Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. v. Hus-
ton,41 ruled that a plaintiff must establish "that the conduct of the
defendant was tantamount to willful, intentional and wanton disre-
gard for others42 and that the character of negligence required to
support a punitive damages award is the same as that required to
support a manslaughter conviction. '43 Using somewhat different
language, the Supreme Court of Florida held in an earlier case
44
that the negligent conduct necessary to support an award of puni-
tive damages must be of a "gross and flagrant character, evincing
reckless disregard of human life" or "which shows wantonness or
recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and wel-
fare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of
others . . .-.
By comparison, an appellate court in Missouri held in one case
46
that punitive damages could be awarded "upon a showing of either
actual or legal malice. '47 The test offered by the court was
36. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter PROSSER].
37. See, e.g., Clements v. Steele, 792 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law);
Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law); Dukeminier v. K-
Mart Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Colo. 1987); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del.
1987).
38. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 10; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 769 F.2d 1451
(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1947 (1986) (applying Oklahoma law).
39. Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc. 105 N.M. 575, 734 P.2d 1258 (1987).
40. Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986).
41. 502 So. 2d 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
42. Id. at 92; see also McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) (expressly
overruling precedent to now require a finding of "actual malice" or "malice in fact").
43. Huston, 502 So. 2d at 92.
44. American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1986).
45. Id. at 861-62 (quoting White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 445 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla.
1984)).
46. Guirl v. Guirl, 708 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
47. Id. at 246.
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"whether the actor did a wrongful act intentionally without just
cause or excuse."48 In another appellate decision, a Missouri
court49 developed this test more fully, ruling that in order to re-
cover punitive damages the plaintiff must establish that the de-
fendant acted "at the least, with legal malice. '5° The court further
explained that "[l]egal malice is shown by the intentional, knowing
commission of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, and in
contravention of, or reckless disregard for, the rights of others."'51
B. Particular Actions
In addition to the courts' use of different standards and lan-
guage to support punitive damage awards, there is also a great deal
of confusion over which actions will support a punitive award. For
example, tort actions for personal injuries arise from a variety of
factual situations ranging from automobile accidents to product li-
ability actions. Once again, the jurisdiction where the case is
brought is often critical. For example, only eighteen states allow
punitive damages in wrongful death actions.52 Typically, the ra-
tionale is that the legislative intent of wrongful death statutes is
compensation, not punishment.
Courts apply different standards in determining whether juries
can award punitive damages for assault and battery. For example,
in Alabama the courts require that "particularized circumstances
of aggravation or insult" be shown before punitive damages will be
awarded.53 Other courts hold that punitive damages are justified
when there is "implied malice" 54 or when there is "malice, or op-
pression, or gross and willful wrong, or a wanton and reckless dis-
regard of plaintiff's rights. '5 5 Nominal damages alone are usually
sufficient to support an award of exemplary damages in an assault
and battery action.5 6 Some jurisdictions, however, require that ac-
48. Id.
49. Collet v. American Nat'l Stores, 708 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
50. Id. at 287.
51. Id.
52. Note, Disallowing Punitive Damages for Wrongful Death, 8 CUMB. L. REv. 567, 574-75
(1977).
53. Peete v. Blackwell, 504 So. 2d 222, 223 (Ala. 1986); see also Harrison v. Mitchell, 391
So. 2d 1038 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). *
54. Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1984).
55. Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, -. , 283 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1981); see also Carey v. After
the Gold Rush, 715 P.2d 803 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
56. Peete, 504 So. 2d at 223; Carey, 715 P.2d 803.
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tual damages be proven before punitive damages can be awarded. 7
Punitive damages are awarded in actions for false imprisonment
in some jurisdictions where there is malice"" or where the wrong-
doer acts willfully, wantonly or in a reckless disregard of the rights
or safety of others.59 The amount of punitive damages for false im-
prisonment varies widely as evidenced by the store detention cases
where store customers have been unlawfully detained on suspicion
of shoplifting.6
Plaintiffs bringing defamation suits must prove actual damages
as well as actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth before
punitive damages may be awarded. The United States Supreme
Court in Gertz v. Welch, Inc." held that the Constitution prohibits
awards of punitive damages even to a private figure plaintiff unless
he proves actual malice.6 2 The Gertz decision also limited "defa-
mation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. 6 3
A recent report by the Rand Corporate Institute for Civil Jus-
tice"4 finds that the upward trend in awards of punitive damages
springs not from personal injury and products liability cases, but
primarily from litigation involving business disputes. The growth
of punitive damages in business and contract cases has resulted in
part from the evolution of the so-called "bad faith" cases. The ver-
dict in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 5 is an example of the large
punitive damage awards that may be made in this type of litiga-
tion. Punitive damages have been awarded for interference with
business relations in a variety of situations where aggravated cir-
cumstances and malice are shown. The general rule in this country
57. Daiss v. Woodbury, 163 Ga. App. 88, 293 S.E.2d 876 (1982).
58. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
59. Lusby v. TG&Y Stores, 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma law), va-
cated on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 40 (1985); see also Collins v. Straight, Inc., 748 F.2d 916
(4th Cir. 1984) (applying Virginia law); Adams v. Zayre Corp., 148 Ill. App. 3d 704, 499
N.E.2d 678 (1986).
60. See Johnson v. Schwegmann Bros., 397 So. 2d 868 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (awarding
$1,000 to customer); Moore's, Inc. v. Garcia, 604 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (award of
$25,000 punitive damages to customer was justified). But see Ward v. National Car Rental
Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. 1980) (refusing to instruct jury on punitive damages).
61. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
62. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring public offi-
cial to prove actual malice before recovering damages for defamation).
63. 418 U.S. at 342.
64. M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (Rand 1987).
65. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (judgment in excess of 11 billion dollars upheld).
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is that damages for breach of contract are limited to pecuniary loss
and punitive damages are not recoverable.66 There are exceptions
to this general rule, however. For example, in those cases where the
complaint alleges that an independent willful tort accompanies or
underlies the breach of contract, the plaintiff may recover punitive
damages upon proof of malice, wantonness or oppression. 67
Punitive damages have also been awarded through arbitration.
The first case in federal court challenging an award of punitive
damages by an arbitration panel arose from a construction con-
tract.6 8 The general contractor cancelled his contract with a sub-
contractor for the construction of a roof after altering the require-
ments for the roof. The subcontractor sued for compensatory and
punitive damages, alleging breach of contract, fraud, misrepresen-
tation and violation of the requirement of good faith and fair deal-
ing. The general contractor stayed the lawsuit for arbitration pur-
suant to a contract provision that required arbitration of all
disputes arising out of the contract. After the arbitration panel
awarded the subcontractor $108,908 in punitive damages and
$41,091 in compensatory damages, the general contractor argued to
the federal district court that the arbitration panel lacked the au-
thority to award punitive damages. The district court rejected this
argument and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 9
Injury to property is another area of the law where courts have
restricted awards of punitive damages. For example, most jurisdic-
tions allow the recovery of punitive damages in trespass actions
only when the defendant's trespass was malicious and willful. Pu-
nitive damages may not be recovered when the defendant acted in
good faith or without wrongful intent. Punitive damages have been
allowed in connection with a wide variety of nuisances. Usually,
66. See, e.g., Southern Discount Co. v. Kirkland, 181 Ga. App. 263, 351 S.E.2d 685 (1986);
Cadillac Vending Co. v. Haynes, 156 Mich. App. 423, 402 N.W.2d 31 (1986), vacated with-
out opinion, 406 N.W.2d 830; Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742
(Tex. 1986).
67. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 530, 238 Cal. Rptr. 363
(1987); L.F. Pace & Sons, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 9 Conn. App. 30, 514 A.2d 766, cert.
denied, 201 Conn. 811, 516 A.2d 886 (1986); McDaniel v. Bass-Smith Funeral Home, Inc., 80
N.C. App. 629, 343 S.E.2d 228 (1986); Cook Assoc., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah
1983).
68. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala.
1984), af['d, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
69. 776 F.2d 269; see also Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d
726 (1985), review denied, 315 N.C. 590, 341 S.E.2d 29 (1986); Ex parte Costa & Head
(Atrium), Ltd., 486 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1986).
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conduct which could be considered willful, wanton or malicious as
well as actual damages must accompany the alleged nuisance
before punitive damages can be awarded.7"
In addition to the torts discussed above, punitive damages have
been awarded in cases involving special duty relationships between
plaintiffs and telephone, telegraph and utility companies, attor-
neys, insurance companies, fiduciaries, and landlords.
Although the various tort actions discussed above are based on
different legal theories, the usual focus with regard to punitive
damages is the defendant's conduct, not the harm to the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, the standards incorporated into jury instructions
on punitive damages are usually confusing and often do not reflect
this focus. Those of us who encourage reform in the area of puni-
tive damages should advocate a more stringent and definite legal
basis for allowing such awards. We can begin by drafting clear, un-
derstandable and precise jury instructions.
V. THE TASK FORCE REPORT
The American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Litigation
recently issued a report wherein they unanimously agreed that pu-
nitive damage awards are one of the greatest problems in the cur-
rent tort system.71 The Task Force recognized that the awards
often bear no relationship to their asserted deterrence function,
and usually reflect the jury's dissatisfaction with a defendant and
their desire to punish him, without regard to the true harm caused
by the defendant's conduct.72 The Task Force noted a "general
feeling" in the legal community that punitive damage awards
should be more difficult to obtain and that the amounts of such
awards should be controlled much more than they are at present.73
A few members of the Task Force favored abolishing punitive
damages altogether.7 4 Those members who favored continuation of
punitive damage awards indicated they might consider abolition if
reform is unsuccessful. One member advocated paying punitive
damages to the state.
70. See, e.g., Monty v. Hayward, 451 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied,
461 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1985).
71. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LITIGATION IS-
SUES 5 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5-6.
74. Id. at 6.
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The Task Force found the most important reform to be limiting
the amount of punitive damages that may be recovered either by
means of a cap or by a formula. Next, the group favored adopting
some means of preventing a defendant in mass tort litigation from
being driven into bankruptcy by cumulative punitive damage
awards for a single act or course of conduct. The Task Force also
supported reducing subsequent punitive damage awards by
amounts previously paid for punitive damages. A few members of
the Task Force expressed interest in creating a federal action in
the nature of interpleader specifically to resolve all related puni-
tive damage claims against the defendant in a single proceeding,
although they doubted the feasibility of this concept.7" The Task
Force apparently did not consider amending the federal multi-dis-
trict panel statute as suggested herein. Significantly, the Task
Force also recommended that consideration be given to raising the
standard of proof for punitive damages, modifying jury instruc-
tions and encouraging greater judicial control over punitive dam-
age awards. 6
VI. STATUTORY CHANGES
There have been significant legislative changes in the states in
the area of tort reform. As one might expect, there has been little
uniformity in the methods used to bring punitive damages under
control. Colorado has enacted several provisions limiting punitive
damages, including a provision that punitive damages cannot ex-
ceed the amount of compensatory damages except in certain de-
limited situations.77 One-third of all punitive damage awards goes
to Colorado's general revenue fund.78
Florida passed legislation requiring that sixty percent of every
punitive damage award be paid to the state.79 Similarly, Iowa re-
quires that seventy-five percent of a punitive damage award be
paid to the state unless the defendant acts with the specific intent
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
78. Id.; see also UPDATE, supra note 2, at 70.
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1987). Interestingly, the sixty per-
cent awarded in personal injury and wrongful death cases goes to Florida's Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund, while in every other case the money goes to the state's general reve-
nue fund.
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to injure the plaintiff.8° In such a case, the plaintiff collects the full
amount of the award.8" Georgia also recently passed legislation re-
quiring that seventy-five percent of punitive damages awarded in
product liability cases shall be paid to the treasury of the state.8 2
New Hampshire enacted an outright prohibition on punitive
damages.8 Oklahoma passed legislation limiting, with some excep-
tions, the punitive damage award to the amount of the compensa-
tory award.84 In Florida, the punitive damages award may not ex-
ceed three times the compensatory award.85
Georgia has placed a cap of $250,000 on punitive damages in
non-product liability cases, but the cap does not apply in cases
where defendant acts with "specific intent" to harm. 6 Virginia has
also recently passed legislation that places a cap of $350,000 on
punitive damage awards.8 " Several jurisdictions enacted caps on
non-economic damages, but did not include punitive damage
awards in these caps.
80. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1987).
81. Id. § 668A.1(2)(a).
82. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987). The statute also prohibits more
than one punitive damage award against the same defendant for the same defective product.
Thus, the first products liability plaintiff injured and into a Georgia court pockets twenty-
five percent of the sole punitive damage award allowed for that product against the defend-
ant. Since punitive damage awards in products liability cases do not come under the cap, see
infra note 86 and accompanying text, this may represent a sizeable sum and spur a race to
the courthouse.
83. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
84. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 9 (West 1987). The limit does not apply where the court
finds as a matter of law that there is "clear and convincing" evidence of wanton, reckless,
oppressive, fraudulent or malicious conduct on the part of the defendant. Id.
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1987). This section does not apply
to class actions. Like the Oklahoma statute, supra note 84, Florida will also allow a jury's
punitive award in excess of the three times actual damages limit to stand. The verdict is
presumed excessive, and the plaintiff must prove to the court that the evidence is clear and
convincing as a matter of law that the award is not excessive in light of the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. Id. § 768.73(1)(b); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f) (Cum.
Supp. 1987).
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (Cum. Supp. 1987). A unique feature of this statute is
that the jury does not hear evidence of a defendant's net worth for purposes of assessing the
proper level of punitive damages until they have first returned a special verdict that malice
has been proven. The amount of punitive damages is then separately tried to the same jury.
See id. § 51-12-5.1(d).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987). A federal district court recently found
the cap on medical malpractice awards to be an unconstitutional infringement on the plain-
tiff's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va.
1986); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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Finally, Iowa,88 South Dakota,89 Alaska, 90 Illinois,9e Oklahoma,92
Georgia" and Florida94 have all enacted legislation that would ei-
ther raise or more specifically define the standard of proof required
for an award of punitive damages.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Excessive punitive damages awards have become a national
problem. Legislation by the states providing for caps on punitive
awards or requiring a fixed formula or a reasonable relationship
between compensatory and punitive damages will help solve the
problem. Legislation that would give the trial court alone the
power to determine the amount of a punitive damages award after
the jury has determined that the defendant's malicious conduct
justifies such an award is a better solution. In the interim and
pending full legislative solutions, the courts should not hesitate to
accomplish this same result by using their remittitur power in ap-
propriate instances.
Abandoning punitive damages altogether is not a sound idea,
since there will always be the unusual case where punishment is
warranted or deterrence is necessary. But under current law and
practice, punitive damages are awarded far too easily, far too often
and far too excessively. State legislators and judges alike must rec-
ognize the dangers inherent in the current system and take steps
to correct what is fast becoming the most serious flaw in our tort
system today.
88. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (West 1987).
89. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (1987).
90. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
91. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-604.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1987).
92. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 9 (West 1987).
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1987).
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